Supreme Court oral argument

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NICOLE ANN THIBODEAU v. DESIGN

GROUP ONE ARCHITECTS, LLC

( SC 16593)

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued February 11— officially released July 2, 2002

Michael D. O’Connell, with whom were Julia B. Mor-ris

and, on the brief, Diane C. Mokriski, for the appel-lant

( defendant).

Gary Phelan, with whom, on the brief, were Kelly

Balser and Elaine Rubinson, for the appellee ( plaintiff).

Bernard E. Jacques filed a brief for the Connecticut

Business and Industry Association as amicus curiae.

Jennifer Jaff, Erin Boggs, Philip D. Tegeler and

Lenora M. Lapidus, filed a brief for the Connecticut

Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. as amici curiae.

Jonathan L. Gould and Maureen M. Murphy filed a

brief for the Connecticut Employment Lawyers Associa-tion

et al. as amici curiae.

Opinion

PALMER, J. Under the Fair Employment Practices

Act, General Statutes § 46a- 51 et seq. ( act), employers

with three or more employees are prohibited from

discriminating against their employees on the basis

of sex, including discrimination related to pregnancy.

See General Statutes § 46a- 60 ( a) ( 1) and ( 7), 1 and

§ 46a- 51 ( 10) 2 and ( 17). 3 At common law, an employer

may terminate an at- will employee for any reason unless

that reason violates some important public policy. This

certified appeal raises an issue that lies at the intersec-tion

of the act and the public policy exception to the

at- will employment doctrine, namely, whether an

employer with fewer than three employees, although

not subject to liability under the act, nevertheless is

barred, on public policy grounds, from discharging an

at- will employee on the basis of pregnancy. Because

the act reflects an unambiguous policy determination

by the legislature that employers with fewer than three

employees shall not be subject to liability for sex dis-crimination,

including pregnancy- related discrimina-tion,

we conclude that a common- law claim for

wrongful discharge on the basis of pregnancy will not

lie against those employers.

The plaintiff, Nicole Ann Thibodeau, commenced this

action against the defendant, Design Group One Archi-tects,

LLC, her former employer, claiming that she had

been wrongfully terminated because of her pregnancy.

The trial court rendered summary judgment for the

defendant, concluding that the plaintiff’s discharge did

not contravene public policy because the exemption

under the act for employers with fewer than three

employees reflects the considered judgment of the legis-lature

that, for policy reasons, such employers shall not

be required to defend against employment discrimina-tion

claims. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate

Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court.

Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 64

Conn. App. 573, 594, 781 A. 2d 363 ( 2001). We granted

the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal to

this court; Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects,

LLC, 258 Conn. 919, 782 A. 2d 1252 ( 2001); and now

reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The relevant facts and procedural history are set forth

in the opinion of the Appellate Court. ‘‘ In April, 1997, the

defendant hired the plaintiff as a receptionist, secretary

and bookkeeper. She was an at- will employee. At all

times relevant, the defendant employed two individuals

and had three principals. The act applies only to those

employers with three or more employees. General Stat-utes

§ 46a- 51 ( 10). 4

‘‘ The plaintiff notified the defendant of her pregnancy

in December, 1997. The defendant terminated the plain-tiff’s

employment on or about April 28, 1998. The plain-tiff

filed a two- count complaint on November 5, 1999,

alleging wrongful termination of her employment in

violation of public policy and a violation of the duty of

good faith and fair dealing. The plaintiff alleged in her

complaint that the defendant had terminated her ‘ as a

result of her doctor appointments,’ which reason con-travened

public policy. In its answer, the defendant

alleged that the plaintiff’s termination stemmed from

her performance deficiencies. The defendant alterna-tively

denied that the plaintiff could avail herself of

Connecticut’s public policy or federal public policy

against pregnancy discrimination as embodied in Gen-eral

Statutes § 46a- 60 ( a) ( 7) 5 and [ Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.], 6 respec-tively.

‘‘ On January 14, 2000, the defendant filed a motion

for summary judgment, claiming that the public policy

proffered by the plaintiff did not apply to the facts of

the case and, therefore, that the defendant was entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. On March 31, 2000,

the court granted the defendant’s motion and rendered

judgment . . . in favor of the defendant as to count

one, which alleged wrongful discharge. [ The trial court

reasoned that although there exists in this state a public

policy against employment discrimination on the basis

of pregnancy, that policy, under the act, is limited to

employers with three or more employees and, therefore,

is inapplicable to the defendant.] Because the court

determined that the defendant did not wrongfully dis-charge

the plaintiff in violation of [ that] public policy,

the second count, alleging a violation of the duty of good

faith and fair dealing, necessarily failed. 7 . . . Thus, the

court rendered summary judgment as to both counts.’’ 8

( Citation omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One

Architects, LLC, supra, 64 Conn. App. 575– 76.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment

of the trial court, concluding that, notwithstanding the

exemption afforded small employers under the act,

‘‘ there is a public policy in Connecticut against sex

discrimination in employment sufficiently expressed in

statutory and constitutional law to allow a [ wrongful

discharge] cause of action for discrimination based on

pregnancy [ against such employers].’’ 9 Id., 574. We

granted the defendant’s petition for certification limited

to the following issue: ‘‘ Did the Appellate Court properly

conclude that there exists a public policy in Connecticut

that forbids an employer of fewer than three employees

from terminating an at- will employee on the basis of

pregnancy?’’ Thibodeau v. Design Group One Archi-tects,

LLC, supra, 258 Conn. 919. We disagree with the

Appellate Court that this state’s public policy prohib-iting

employment discrimination on the basis of preg-nancy

extends to employers with fewer than three

employees. Consequently, we conclude that the trial

court properly determined that the defendant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.

We begin our analysis of the certified issue by setting

forth the law governing the public policy exception to

the at- will employment doctrine. ‘‘ In Connecticut, an

employer and employee have an at- will employment

relationship in the absence of a contract to the contrary.

Employment at will grants both parties the right to

terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason,

at any time without fear of legal liability. Beginning in

the late 1950s, however, courts began to carve out cer-tain

exceptions to the at- will employment doctrine,

thereby giving rise to tort claims for wrongful discharge.

Certain employer practices provoked public disfavor,

and unlimited employer discretion to fire employees

eventually yielded to a more limited rule.’’ Thibodeau

v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 64 Conn.

App. 577.

Following that trend, this court, in Sheets v. Teddy’s

Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A. 2d 385 ( 1980),

‘‘ sanctioned a common- law cause of action for wrongful

discharge in situations in which the reason for the dis-charge

involved impropriety derived from some

important violation of public policy. Id., 475; 10 see Mor-ris

v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 679, 513

A. 2d 66 ( 1986); Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc.,

193 Conn. 558, 572, 479 A. 2d 781 ( 1984). In doing so, we

recognized a public policy limitation on the traditional

employment at- will doctrine in an effort to balance the

competing interests of employers and employees. Anti-nerella

v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 492, 642 A. 2d 699 ( 1994).

In Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., supra, 680, we recog-nized

the inherent vagueness of the concept of public

policy and the difficulty encountered when attempting

to define precisely the contours of the public policy

exception. In evaluating claims, [ w] e look to see

whether the plaintiff has . . . alleged that his dis-charge

violated any explicit statutory or constitutional

provision . . . or whether he alleged that his dismissal

contravened any judicially conceived notion of public

policy. . . . Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp.,

240 Conn. 576, 580– 81, 693 A. 2d 293 ( 1997).’’ ( Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Daley v. Aetna Life & Casu-alty

Co., 249 Conn. 766, 798, 734 A. 2d 112 ( 1999); accord

Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66,

76– 77, 700 A. 2d 655 ( 1997).

On several occasions since the release of our decision

in Sheets, we have recognized the sufficiency of a claim

under the public policy exception to the at- will employ-ment

doctrine. For example, in Antinerella v. Rioux,

supra, 229 Conn. 479, we held that the plaintiff, a deputy

sheriff, had stated a claim for wrongful termination

against the defendant, the high sheriff of Hartford

county; id., 493– 94; predicated upon the deputy sheriff’s

allegation that the high sheriff had discharged him ‘‘ in

order to take [ over] his [ process serving] business and

personally benefit under [ a] statutorily forbidden and

illegal fee splitting arrangement he had made with sev-eral

appointed deputy sheriffs.’’ 11 Id., 491. In so holding,

we noted that the ‘‘ case [ had] present[ ed] claims that

genuinely involve[ d] the mandates of public policy

derived directly from state statutes.’’ Id., 493.

In Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 240

Conn. 578– 79, the plaintiff, John Faulkner, alleged that

he had been fired for refusing to participate in an illegal

scheme to defraud the government in connection with

the use of defective parts in the production of helicop-ters.

In reversing the judgment of the trial court striking

the count of Faulkner’s complaint alleging that his ter-mination

was contrary to the policy expressed in the

Major Frauds Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1031, we concluded that

a wrongful discharge claim could be predicated solely

on a violation of federal, as opposed to state, law. Faulk-ner

v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 584– 86.

Similarly, in Parsons v. United Technologies Corp.,

supra, 243 Conn. 66, we rejected the defendant employ-er’s

claim that the plaintiff employee, an instructor of

aircraft maintenance, had failed to state a claim for

wrongful discharge on the basis of his allegation that

he was terminated for refusing to comply with his

employer��s directive to report to work at a Bahrain

military base notwithstanding the issuance of a travel

advisory by the United States Department of State coun-seling

against all nonessential travel to Bahrain owing

to military action in the Persian Gulf region. 12 See id.,

85– 87. We rested our conclusion on the fact that the

plaintiff’s claim of a public policy violation found sup-port

in several state statutes explicitly requiring employ-ers

to maintain a reasonably safe workplace for its

employees. 13 See id., 79– 80.

Although we have been willing to recognize, pursuant

to Sheets and its progeny, a claim for wrongful termina-tion

in appropriate cases, we repeatedly have under-scored

‘‘ our adherence to the principle that the public

policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered

termination of an at- will employment relationship is a

narrow one . . . .’’ Id., 79; accord Burnham v. Karl &

Gelb, P. C., 252 Conn. 153, 159, 745 A. 2d 178 ( 2000); see

also, e. g., Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra,

179 Conn. 477 (‘‘ courts should not lightly intervene to

impair the exercise of managerial discretion or to

foment unwarranted litigation’’). Consequently, we

have rejected claims of wrongful discharge that have

not been predicated upon an employer’s violation of an

important and clearly articulated public policy. See,

e. g., Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P. C., supra, 61 ( plaintiff

failed to state claim because allegations of retaliatory

discharge did not satisfy requirements of statute upon

which claim was based); Daley v. Aetna Life& Casualty

Co., supra, 249 Conn. 804 ( plaintiff could not prevail on

claim that public policy required employers to provide

flexible work schedules for working parents because

no statute mandates such accommodation); Carbone v.

Atlantic Richfield Co., 204 Conn. 460, 468– 70, 528 A. 2d

1137 ( 1987) ( oil company employee, who had been ter-minated

for failing to obtain accurate information

regarding competitors’ pricing practices, did not allege

facts sufficient to support claim that termination vio-lated

public policy); Morris v. Hartford Courant Co.,

supra, 200 Conn. 680 (‘‘[ a] false but negligently made

accusation of criminal conduct as a basis for dismissal

is not a ‘ demonstrably improper reason for dismissal’ ’’

when employer not statutorily obligated to investigate

veracity of allegation). In each such instance, we found

no statutorily based expression of public policy suffi-cient

to warrant an exception to the at- will employ-ment

doctrine.

We now turn briefly to the pertinent provisions of

the act, which prohibit discriminatory employment

practices on the basis of sex, including discrimination

related to pregnancy. See footnotes 1 and 3 of this

opinion. The act creates a mechanism pursuant to

which any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discrimi-natory

employment practice may seek administrative

redress through the commission on human rights and

opportunities ( commission). See General Statutes

§ 46a- 82 et seq. The act further provides that any such

person who has timely filed a complaint with, and

obtained a release from, the commission also may bring

a civil action against his or her employer. See General

Statutes § § 46a- 100 through 46a- 104. A complainant

who successfully prosecutes a civil action under the

act is entitled to ‘‘ such legal and equitable relief [ as the

court may deem] appropriate including, but not limited

to, temporary or permanent injunctive relief, attorney’s

fees and court costs.’’ General Statutes § 46a- 104. As

originally enacted, the act applied only to employers

with five or more employees. Public Acts 1947, No. 171,

§ 1. In 1967, however, the act was amended to include

employers with three or more employees. Public Acts

1967, No. 253 ( codified as amended at General Statutes

§ 46a- 51 [ 10]). Although the act has been amended many

times since 1967; e. g., Public Acts 1979, No. 79- 480, § 1

( extending protections of act to cover discrimination

based on present or past history of mental disorder);

Public Acts 1980, No. 80- 285 ( extending protections of

act to cover sexual harassment); Public Acts 1990, No.

90- 330, § 3 ( extending protections of act to cover dis-crimination

based on learning disability); Public Acts

1998, No. 98- 180 ( extending protections of act to cover

discrimination based on genetic information); the legis-lature

has retained the exemption for employers with

fewer than three employees.

Our resolution of this appeal hinges on the signifi-cance

of the statutory exemption for employers with

fewer than three employees. In particular, we must

determine whether that exemption reflects a policy

decision by the legislature to shield those employers

from exposure to discrimination claims generally. If so,

allowing the plaintiff to maintain her wrongful dis-charge

action against the defendant would contravene

that legislative policy.

In the present case, the Appellate Court rejected the

view advanced by the defendant and adopted by the

trial court that the statutory exemption for employers

with fewer than three employees constitutes an expres-sion

of this state’s public policy that that category of

small employers should not have to defend against dis-crimination

claims, including claims, such as the one

in the present case, alleging discrimination on the basis

of pregnancy. The Appellate Court observed that the

act ‘‘ announced a general public policy against sex dis-crimination

in employment’’; Thibodeau v. Design

Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 64 Conn. App. 584;

and concluded that ‘‘ the language, history and public

policy underlying the act . . . reflect a cognizable leg-islative

and societal concern for eliminating discrimina-tion

on the basis of sex in Connecticut.’’ Id., 586. In

rejecting the argument that the act’s exemption for

small employers constitutes a limited exception to that

otherwise broad policy mandate, the Appellate Court

reasoned that the ‘‘ act both embodies a public policy,

which is universal for all employees, and provides a

statutory remedy, which is limited to employees who

work for employers with three or more employees.

There are public policy considerations inherent in the

question of whether we should uniformly and blindly

follow § 46a- 51 ( 10) regardless of the fact situation of

the particular case. We determine that the statutory

subsection must be read within the boundaries imposed

by our public policy as expressed elsewhere in the same

statute, other statutes and our constitution.’’ ( Emphasis

in original.) Id.

The Appellate Court further explained: ‘‘ A distinction

exists between the policy underlying a statute and the

remedy provided by the statute to accomplish that pol-icy.

We are not alone in identifying that distinction. In

a case involving an action for wrongful discharge on

the basis of sex discrimination in which the defendant

employed fewer than the minimum number of employ-ees

required by the state antidiscrimination law, the

Washington Supreme Court recently stated: ‘ By [ the

statutory section defining employer] the legislature nar-rows

the statutory remedies but does not narrow the

public policy which is broader than the remedy pro-vided.

Thus, the statutory remedy is not in itself an

expression of the public policy, and the definition of

‘‘ employer’’ for the purpose of applying the statutory

remedy does not alter or otherwise undo to any degree

th[ e] state’s public policy against employment discrimi-nation.

. . . If it is argued that the exclusion of small

employers from the statutory remedy is itself a public

policy, that policy is simply to limit the statutory rem-edy,

but is not an affirmative policy to ‘‘[ exempt] small

employers from [ common- law] discrimination suits.’’ ’

Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash. 2d 58, 70, 993 P. 2d 901

( 2000) ( en banc).’’ Thibodeau v. Design Group One

Architects, LLC, supra, 64 Conn. App. 586– 87.

In addition to the act itself, the Appellate Court relied

on several statutory provisions contained in chapter

814c of the General Statutes, entitled ‘‘ Human Rights

and Opportunities,’’ that prohibit discrimination on the

basis of sex in certain circumstances. 14 Id., 588 n. 9. The

Appellate Court also noted that a number of federal

laws, including ‘‘ Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

[ 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.], the Family and Medical Leave

Act of 1993, 29 U. S. C. § 2601 et seq., and the Pregnancy

Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e ( k), simi-larly

announce a public policy against sex discrimina-tion.’’

Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC,

supra, 64 Conn. App. 588– 89. The Appellate Court fur-ther

concluded that the public policy of this state in

regard to sex discrimination in employment may be

gleaned from the equal protection clause of the state

constitution, 15 which guarantees the equal protection

of laws and specifically prohibits, inter alia, sex- based

discrimination in connection with a person’s exercise

or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights. Id.,

589, citing Conn. Const., amend. XXI. Finally, the Appel-late

Court relied on our pronouncement in Evening

Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, 168

Conn. 26, 34, 357 A. 2d 498 ( 1975), that the legislature’s

record of combating sex discrimination, in employment

and otherwise, ‘‘ ‘ evidences a firm commitment . . . to

do away with sex discrimination altogether.’ ’’ 16 Thibo-deau

v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 588,

quoting Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for

Women, supra, 34; see also Quinnipiac Council, Boy

Scouts of America, Inc. v. Commission on Human

Rights & Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287, 297, 528 A. 2d

352 ( 1987) ( noting state’s ‘‘ compelling’’ interest in elimi-nating

discrimination against women).

Although we acknowledge that there exists a general

public policy in this state to eliminate all forms of invidi-ous

discrimination, including sex discrimination, we

nevertheless disagree with the Appellate Court that the

plaintiff therefore is entitled to maintain a discrimina-tory

discharge claim against this defendant. Our dis-

agreement arises from the fact that the exemption

contained in the act for employers with fewer than

three employees is, itself, an expression of public policy

that cannot be separated from the policy reflected in

the act’s ban on discriminatory employment practices.

To conclude otherwise would require us to turn a blind

eye to the legislative policy decision reflected in the

statutory exemption for small employers and to the

reasons underlying that decision.

Although the legislative history of the act is silent as

to why the legislature chose to exempt small employers

from the purview of the act, 17 the primary reason for

the exemption cannot be doubted: the legislature did

not wish to subject this state’s smallest employers to the

significant burdens, financial and otherwise, associated

with the defense of employment discrimination claims.

Indeed, this reason formed one of the primary bases

for Congress’ decision to exempt employers with fewer

than fifteen employees from the analogous antidiscrimi-nation

provisions of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F. 3d 937, 940 ( 7th

Cir. 1999) (‘‘ The purpose [ of the minimum employee

threshold under Title VII] is not to encourage or con-done

discrimination . . . . [ Rather] [ t] he purpose is to

spare very small firms from the potentially crushing

expense of mastering the intricacies of the antidiscrimi-nation

laws, establishing procedures to assure compli-ance,

and defending against suits when efforts at

compliance fail.’’); see also Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66

F. 3d 1295, 1314 ( 2d Cir. 1995) ( Congress sought to pro-tect

small employers from costs associated with litigat-ing

discrimination claims under Title VII by establishing

minimum employee requirement); Miller v. Maxwell��s

International, Inc., 991 F. 2d 583, 587 ( 9th Cir. 1993),

cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 510 U. S. 1109,

114 S. Ct. 1049, 127 L. Ed. 2d 372 ( 1994) ( same). It also

is likely that our state legislature, like Congress, was

concerned with ‘‘ the protection of intimate and personal

relations existing in small businesses . . . .’’ Tomka v.

Seiler Corp., supra, 1314. In addition, we reasonably

may presume that the legislature was motivated to

exempt small employers in part because its fundamen-tal

objective was to eliminate discrimination on a larger

scale; see Jennings v. Marralle, 8 Cal. 4th 121, 134, 876

P. 2d 1074, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 ( 1994); and because

of the difficulties inherent in detecting and policing

discrimination on a small scale. Id., 133.

Although one may agree or disagree that these rea-sons

provide a convincing basis for exempting small

employers from the act, we are not free to disregard

the legislative policy determination upon which the

exemption is founded. See, e. g., Skindzier v. Commis-sioner

of Social Services, 258 Conn. 642, 661, 784 A. 2d

323 ( 2001) (‘‘[ this] court is precluded from substituting

its own ideas of what might be a wise [ policy] in place

of a clear expression of legislative will’’). Our failure

to recognize the public policy reflected in the exemption

of small employers would expose them to liability for

employment discrimination claims notwithstanding a

clearly expressed legislative preference to the contrary.

To disregard that policy decision would violate a funda-mental

principle underlying our recognition of public

policy exceptions to the at- will employment doctrine,

namely, that we may not ‘‘ ignore [ a] statement of public

policy that is represented by a relevant statute.’’ Daley

v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, 249 Conn. 804; see

also Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179

Conn. 480 (‘‘[ c] ertainly when there is a relevant state

statute we should not ignore the statement of public

policy that it represents’’).

The dissent states that ‘‘ the majority concludes, with-out

expressly saying so, that it is the public policy of

this state to permit small employers to discriminate

against their employees on the basis of sex.’’ That inac-curate

characterization of our conclusion is tantamount

to saying that the legislature, in defining the term

‘‘ employer’’ in § 46a- 51 ( 10) as it did, made a policy

determination favoring sex discrimination by those

employers who do not fall within that definition. The

purpose of the statutory definition of ‘‘ employer’’ is

neither to condone nor to encourage sex discrimination

but, rather, to relieve small employers from the burdens

of defending against sex discrimination claims. In other

words, the policy underlying the definition recognizes

that some otherwise meritorious sex discrimination

claims may go unremedied. It also reveals the legisla-ture’s

recognition, however, that small employers

should not have to litigate unmeritorious claims. Thus,

the policy underlying the definition is not to permit sex

discrimination. The definition, rather, reflects a consid-ered

legislative judgment that it is the public policy of

this state to shield small employers from having to bear

the costs of litigating sex discrimination claims regard-less

of their merit.

By recognizing this legislative policy judgment, we

do not minimize the beneficent purposes of the act.

Indeed, the important and salutary public policy

expressed in the antidiscrimination provisions of the

act cannot be overstated. As we have explained, how-ever,

the act also embodies a second public policy,

namely, that employers with fewer than three employ-ees

shall not be required to defend against employment

discrimination claims. Contrary to the urging of the

plaintiff, we cannot give voice to the act’s prohibitions

and simultaneously ignore its exemption for small

employers, for the latter operates as a limitation on the

former. As the California Supreme Court has succinctly

put it, ‘‘ when the . . . statute articulating a public pol-icy

also includes certain substantive limitations in scope

or remedy, these limitations also circumscribe the com-mon

law wrongful discharge cause of action.’’ Moorpark

v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 1159, 959 P. 2d 752,

77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445 ( 1998).

The plaintiff disputes the foregoing proposition,

asserting that, although the legislature shielded small

employers from the administrative procedures and rem-edies

of the act, the legislature did not necessarily

intend that those employers also would be protected

against common- law discriminatory discharge claims.

In support of this contention, the plaintiff notes the

differences between the remedies available under the

statutory scheme and those available to a plaintiff who

successfully prosecutes a common- law wrongful dis-charge

action. We are not persuaded that these distinc-tions

support the plaintiff’s contention.

The plaintiff first maintains that the legislature rea-sonably

may have been prompted to exclude small

employers from the act to relieve them from the burdens

of the administrative scheme created by the act. The

plaintiff contends that, under this rationale for the statu-tory

exemption, subjecting an employer with fewer than

three employees to a common- law wrongful discharge

action would not be inconsistent with any policy

embodied in the act inasmuch as the employer would

not be exposed to any administrative mechanism. We

reject this argument because we disagree with its prem-ise,

namely, that the act’s administrative scheme is bur-densome.

That scheme, which requires complaints to be filed

with and investigated by the commission; see General

Statutes § § 46a- 82 and 46a- 83; and which provides for

the conciliation, arbitration and mediation of disputes;

see General Statutes § § 46a- 83 ( f) and 46a- 83b; ‘‘ was

designed to provide both complainants and respondents

with a means to resolve discrimination claims without

the greater delay and expense characteristic of bringing

an action in state or federal court.’’ Williams v. Com-mission

on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn.

258, 298, 777 A. 2d 645 ( 2001) ( Zarella, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part); see also Angelsea Pro-ductions,

Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights &

Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 696– 97, 674 A. 2d 1300

( 1996) ( pertinent provisions of act intended to provide

parties with mechanism for fair, expeditious and infor-mal

resolution of civil rights complaints). Thus, a pur-pose

of the administrative complaint procedure is to

protect employers; as we previously have stated, that

procedure is designed ‘‘ to guard against subjecting a

respondent to a hearing upon every complaint which

might be made to the commission, however unfounded.

To guard against such an eventuality, the statute

requires the commission, once a complaint has been

filed, to investigate it, and it is only after such prelimi-nary

investigation has established that there is reason-able

cause for action and after arbitration methods have

failed that a hearing is authorized.’’ ( Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commis-

sion on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 691,

quoting Waterbury v. Commission on Human Rights&

Opportunities, 160 Conn. 226, 235, 278 A. 2d 771 ( 1971).

Contrary to the argument advanced by the plaintiff,

there is no reason to suggest that the legislature would

have excluded small employers from the administrative

scheme, which was designed to protect, among others,

all employers from the burdens of meritless litigation,

unless it had intended to shield small employers in

particular from discrimination claims generally. In view

of the fact that the administrative mechanism is

designed to promote the informal resolution of discrimi-nation

complaints so as to avoid the delay and expense

associated with litigation, it defies common sense to

conclude that the legislature would have eschewed that

mechanism for this state’s smallest employers— those

least likely to be able to afford such litigation— in favor

of an approach that would require only small employers

to defend discriminatory discharge claims in court in

the first instance.

The plaintiff also asserts that, because certain reme-dies

available under the act, specifically, court costs

and attorney’s fees, generally are not available at com-mon

law, we may infer that the legislature excluded

small employers from the act not to shield them from

liability entirely but, rather, to protect them from the

enhanced statutory remedies. This argument fails for

several reasons. First, those remedies were not added

to the statutory scheme until 1991; see Public Acts 1991,

No. 91- 331, § 5; see also Bridgeport Hospital v. Com-mission

on Human Rights & Opportunities, 232 Conn.

91, 113, 653 A. 2d 782 ( 1995); even though the act has

contained an exemption for small employers since its

original passage in 1947.18 It is apparent, therefore, that

the legislative decision to exempt such employers had

nothing to do with those statutory remedies. Further-more,

in light of the important purposes served by the

act’s administrative procedures, it is highly unlikely that

the legislature would have opted to exclude small

employers from that mechanism simply to prevent an

award of court costs or attorney’s fees against those

employers. Indeed, if the legislature merely had been

unwilling to subject small employers to the statutory

remedies, the most effective way to alleviate that con-cern

would have been to exempt such employers from

those remedies, rather than to exclude them from the

act entirely. We therefore reject the plaintiff’s assertion

that the legislature excluded small employers from the

act because of the additional remedies available

thereunder. 19

As we have indicated, the Appellate Court also relied

on several state and federal antidiscrimination statutes,

and our state constitution’s equal protection clause, to

support its conclusion that there exists a well- defined

public policy in this state against pregnancy- related dis-crimination

that applies to all employers, including

those with fewer than three employees. We again dis-agree

with the reasoning of the Appellate Court. With

respect to the federal and state statutes upon which

the Appellate Court relied, those statutes, although

expressive of a general public policy to eliminate sex

discrimination, simply cannot trump the expression of

public policy contained in the statutory scheme— the

act— that specifically addresses discriminatory employ-ment

practices and expressly exempts small employers

from its coverage. As we repeatedly have stated in

seeking to ascertain legislative intent from more than

one statutory pronouncement on a particular subject,

specific terms in a statute covering a given subject

matter will prevail over the more general language of

the same or another statute that otherwise might be

controlling. See, e. g., In re Darlene C., 247 Conn. 1, 14,

717 A. 2d 1242 ( 1998); State v. State Employees’ Review

Board, 239 Conn. 638, 653, 687 A. 2d 134 ( 1997). This oft-stated

principle reflects the fact that specific statutory

language constitutes a more accurate representation of

the legislature’s purpose or intent than more general

pronouncements concerning the same subject matter.

With respect to the equal protection clause of the

Connecticut constitution; Conn. Const., amend. XXI;

that provision, which broadly prohibits, inter alia, sex

discrimination in a person’s exercise or enjoyment of

his or her civil or political rights, is ‘‘ designed as a

safeguard against acts of the state and [ does] not limit

the private conduct of individuals or persons.’’

( Emphasis added.) Lockwood v. Killian, 172 Conn. 496,

501, 375 A. 2d 998 ( 1977); see also Cologne v. Westfarms

Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 63, 469 A. 2d 1201 ( 1984)

( same). In light of the foregoing limitation on the protec-tions

afforded under the equal protection clause of the

state constitution, 20 we do not see how that constitu-tional

guarantee can be construed as a statement of

public policy sufficient to override the explicit, contrary

expression of legislative intent embodied in the act.

We also disagree with the Appellate Court’s reliance

on Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for

Women, supra, 168 Conn. 26, in which we noted our

legislature’s ‘‘ firm commitment . . . to do away with

sex discrimination altogether.’’ 21 Id., 34. Of course, there

can be no doubt that the elimination of invidious dis-crimination

in employment is the overarching goal of

the act. It also cannot be doubted, as we observed in

Evening Sentinel, that our legislature is committed to

that goal. But just as the primary responsibility for for-mulating

public policy resides in the legislature; see,

e. g., Toise v. Rowe, 243 Conn. 623, 629, 707 A. 2d 25

( 1998); Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board, 224 Conn. 693,

709, 620 A. 2d 780 ( 1993); so, too, does the responsibility

for determining, within constitutional limits, the meth-ods

to be employed in achieving those policy goals.

Thus, we are constrained to recognize the balance that

the legislature has struck between the state’s dual inter-

est in policing and eliminating sex discrimination in

employment, on the one hand, and protecting small

employers from the potentially heavy costs associated

with defending against discrimination claims, on the

other. 22

The plaintiff cites to cases from several other jurisdic-tions

in which courts have permitted a wrongful dis-charge

claim akin to the plaintiff’s claim even though

the complainants in those cases, like the plaintiff, were

barred from bringing a statutory discrimination action

owing to the existence of a statutory exemption for

small employers. See, e. g., Molesworth v. Brandon, 341

Md. 621, 628, 637, 672 A. 2d 608 ( 1996); Collins v. Riz-kana,

73 Ohio St. 3d 65, 70– 71, 74, 652 N. E. 2d 653 ( 1995);

Roberts v. Dudley, supra, 140 Wash. 2d 70– 71, 77; Wil-liamson

v. Greene, 200 W. Va. 421, 431, 490 S. E. 2d 23

( 1997). Nearly all of those cases are distinguishable

from the present case, however, because the statutory

schemes involved in those cases, while exempting cer-tain

small employers, also expressly announce a broad

public policy barring sex discrimination in employment

by all employers. 23 More importantly, however, we

agree with the Supreme Court of Oklahoma that ‘‘[ t] he

body of our common law, which serves to supplement

the corpus of statutory enactments, is powerless to

abrogate the latter, either in whole or in part. Validly

expressed legislative will must always control over con-trary

notions of the unwritten law. When in pari materia,

statutory law and the precepts of either preexisting or

after- declared common law are to be construed

together as one consistent and harmonious whole. Once

an interaction of the two sources has been measured

by these principles, it is clear that . . . [ the plaintiff’s]

common- law claim [ is] not actionable as a discharge

in breach of public policy because her employer, who

engaged fewer than [ the statutorily specified number

of] employees, is outside the [ a] ct’s purview.’’ Brown

v. Ford, 905 P. 2d 223, 228– 29 ( Okla. 1995); see also

Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P. C., supra, 252 Conn. 159– 61

( plaintiff alleging wrongful discharge in violation of

public policy embodied in statute must demonstrate

that discharge violated all relevant statutory elements).

In concluding that the plaintiff should be able to

pursue a common- law wrongful discharge claim against

the defendant on the basis of this state’s policy against

sex discrimination, the dissent simply ignores the

explicit countervailing expression of public policy that

is reflected in the act’s exemption for small employers.

In other words, the dissent fails to acknowledge that

this state’s public policy against sex discrimination by

private employers is not absolute: the legislature has

carved out an exception to that policy for small

employers.

The dissent does not contend that the reasons under-lying

that policy judgment are improper or illegitimate.

The dissent makes no claim, moreover, that the policy

concerns reflected in the statutory exemption for small

employers are, for some reason, inapplicable to com-mon-

law discriminatory discharge claims. Thus, the dis-sent

fails to address the question that forms the crux

of this appeal: Why would the legislature have exempted

small employers from the act unless it had concluded,

as a policy matter, that such employers should not be

required to defend against sex discrimination claims,

notwithstanding this state’s general public policy

against sex discrimination? Rather, the dissent merely

asserts, without explanation, that the policy expressed

in the exemption is trumped by the public policy against

sex discrimination. The fundamental flaw in this unsup-ported

assertion, however, is manifest: the legislature

has unambiguously expressed a contrary view by

exempting small employers from liability for sex dis-crimination.

In sum, we see no reason why the legislature would

have excluded small employers from the act unless it

had decided, as a matter of policy, that such employers

should be shielded from liability for employment dis-crimination,

including sex and pregnancy- related dis-crimination.

Neither the plaintiff nor the dissent has

articulated any logical reason why this legislative policy

decision is not fully applicable to common- law claims

based on the public policy exception to the at- will

employment doctrine. The legislature may wish to

revisit its policy judgment regarding small employers.

We, however, are not free to ignore the clear expression

of public policy embodied in the statutory exemption

currently afforded small employers under the act.

Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the plain-tiff

has failed to state a legally cognizable claim against

the defendant. 24

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and

the case is remanded to that court with direction to

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this opinion SULLIVAN, C. J., and BORDEN, J.,

concurred.

1 General Statutes § 46a- 60 ( a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘( a) It shall be

a discriminatory practice in violation of this section:

‘‘( 1) For an employer, by himself or his agent, except in the case of a

bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or

to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate

against him in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employ-ment

because of the individual’s . . . sex . . . .

* * *

‘‘( 7) For an employer, by himself or his agent: ( A) To terminate a woman’s

employment because of her pregnancy; ( B) to refuse to grant to that

employee a reasonable leave of absence for disability resulting from her

pregnancy; ( C) to deny to that employee, who is disabled as a result of

pregnancy, any compensation to which she is entitled as a result of the

accumulation of disability or leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans main-tained

by the employer; ( D) to fail or refuse to reinstate the employee

to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and

accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other service credits

upon her signifying her intent to return unless, in the case of a private

employer, the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it

impossible or unreasonable to do so; ( E) to fail or refuse to make a reason-able

effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any suitable temporary posi-tion

which may be available in any case in which an employee gives written

notice of her pregnancy to her employer and the employer or pregnant

employee reasonably believes that continued employment in the position

held by the pregnant employee may cause injury to the employee or fetus;

( F) to fail or refuse to inform the pregnant employee that a transfer pursuant

to subparagraph ( E) of this subdivision may be appealed under the provisions

of . . . chapter [ 814c]; or ( G) to fail or refuse to inform his employees, by

any reasonable means, that they must give written notice of their pregnancy

in order to be eligible for transfer to a temporary position . . . .’’

2 General Statutes § 46a- 51 ( 10) defines the term ‘‘ employer’’ as ‘‘ the state

and all political subdivisions thereof and . . . any person or employer with

three or more persons in his employ . . . .’’

3 General Statutes § 46a- 51 ( 17) provides that ‘‘ ‘[ d] iscrimination on the

basis of sex’ includes but is not limited to discrimination related to preg-nancy

. . . .’’

4 See footnote 2 of this opinion.

5 See footnote 1 of this opinion.

6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., prohibits

employers from ‘‘ discriminat[ ing] against any individual with respect to

his [ or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .’’ 42 U. S. C. § 2000e- 2 ( a) ( 1)

( 1994). This prohibition applies to discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.

42 U. S. C. § 2000e ( k) ( 1994). The antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII

are applicable only to employers with fifteen or more employees. See 42

U. S. C. § 2000e ( b) ( 1994).

7 The Appellate Court explained, and the plaintiff does not dispute, that

this court ‘‘ requires an at- will employee to challenge his or her dismissal

on the basis of a public policy violation whether the plaintiff frames the

claim in tort or in contract. Therefore, if the plaintiff’s tort claim fails because

there was no public policy violation, an alleged violation of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing similarly fails.’’ Thibodeau v. Design

Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 64 Conn. App. 576 n. 2.

8 ‘‘ In its memorandum of decision, the [ trial] court recognized the existence

of a factual dispute concerning the plaintiff’s termination. The plaintiff

asserted that her pregnancy precipitated her discharge, whereas the defen-dant

insisted that it was her poor job performance. The court held, however,

that even if the plaintiff’s allegation accurately identified the reason for her

termination, an at- will employee has no cause of action for wrongful dis-charge

when an employer of fewer than three persons fires her on the

ground of pregnancy.’’ Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC,

supra, 64 Conn. App. 577. As the Appellate Court aptly noted, a ‘‘ motion to

strike for failure to state a cause of action could have resolved that question.

See Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 693 A. 2d 293

( 1997); Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A. 2d 385

( 1980). The motion for summary judgment, and the affidavit and counteraffi-davit

filed in connection therewith, raised a question of fact that would

have precluded summary judgment if the plaintiff had stated a cause of

action.’’ Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 574 n. 1.

9 Having concluded that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action against

the defendant, the Appellate Court remanded the case to the trial court for its

resolution of the factual question raised in the parties’ competing affidavits as

to whether the defendant terminated the plaintiff because of her pregnancy

or because of her poor job performance. See Thibodeau v. Design Group

One Architects, LLC, supra, 64 Conn. App. 594.

10 In Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 471, the

plaintiff, Emard H. Sheets, was employed, on an at- will basis, by a frozen

foods producer as a quality control director and operations manager. Id.,

472– 73. Sheets alleged that he was fired because he had notified his employer

that various product labels contained false or misleading information regard-ing

the product’s weight or condition in violation of the requirements of

the Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, General Statutes

( Rev. to 1977) § 19- 211 et seq., now codified at General Statutes § 21a- 91 et

seq. Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 478. We concluded that

Sheets, who faced potential criminal sanctions for failing to report the

mislabelings; id.; see General Statutes ( Rev. to 1977) § 19- 215, now codified

at General Statutes § 21a- 95; had stated a claim for wrongful discharge on

the basis of his contention that he was dismissed in retaliation for his efforts

to ensure that his employer’s products would comply with the applicable

law relating to labeling. Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 480.

11 The high sheriff’s alleged misconduct violated General Statutes § 6- 36

and General Statutes ( Rev. to 1993) § 6- 46, both of which authorize the

removal from office of any high sheriff who engages in fee splitting. Antiner-ella

v. Rioux, supra, 229 Conn. 494; see General Statutes § 6- 36; General

Statutes ( Rev. to 1993) § 6- 46.

12 The plaintiff employee was assigned to work in Bahrain in September,

1990; Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 243 Conn. 68– 69; ‘‘ at

[ which] time the United States . . . and certain allied nations, including

Bahrain, were involved in a joint military action, known as Operation Desert

Shield, taken in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.’’ Id., 69.

13 The plaintiff employee relied primarily on General Statutes § 31- 49,

which provides that employers shall exercise reasonable care to maintain

a reasonably safe workplace for their employees, and General Statutes § 31-

370, which requires employers to furnish their employees with employment

and a place of employment free from recognized hazards likely to cause

death or serious physical injury to their employees.

14 The Appellate Court cited the following provisions contained in chapter

814c of the General Statutes: ‘‘ General Statutes § 46a- 58 ( prohibiting depriva-tion

of rights on account of sex); General Statutes § 46a- 64 ( prohibiting

discriminatory public accommodations practices); General Statutes § 46a-

64c ( prohibiting discriminatory housing practices); General Statutes § 46a-

66 ( prohibiting discriminatory credit practices); General Statutes § 46a- 70

( guaranteeing equal employment in state agencies); General Statutes § 46a-

71 ( prohibiting discriminatory practices by state agencies); General Statutes

§ 46a- 72 ( prohibiting discrimination in job placement by state agencies);

General Statutes § 46a- 73 ( prohibiting discrimination in state licensing and

charter procedures); General Statutes § 46a- 75 ( prohibiting discrimination in

educational and vocational programs); General Statutes § 46a- 76 ( prohibiting

discrimination in allocation of state benefits).’’ Thibodeau v. Design Group

One Architects, LLC, supra, 64 Conn. App. 588 n. 9.

15 Article first, § 20, of the constitution of Connecticut, as amended by

articles five and twenty- one of the amendments, provides in relevant part:

‘‘ No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected

to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her

civil or political rights because of . . . sex . . . .’’

16 Judge Flynn concurred in the result reached by the Appellate Court

majority in Thibodeau, but disagreed with the majority’s reliance on the act

itself as a source of the public policy underlying the exception to at- will

employment doctrine. Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC,

supra, 64 Conn. App. 594– 96 ( Flynn, J., concurring). In so concluding, Judge

Flynn relied on the legislative determination, as expressed in the act, that

an employee has no remedy against an employer with fewer than three

employees. Id., 595 ( Flynn, J., concurring). Judge Flynn stated further:

‘‘ Instead, I would look to the act only to ensure that its policy is not at odds

with the public policy we find elsewhere, conclude that the act’s statutory

policy is consistent with the strong, clear and fundamental public policy

we find in the other sources, and permit a Sheets type remedy if the at- will

employee in the small workplace can prove her claim that she was wrongfully

discharged because of pregnancy.’’ Id., 595– 96 ( Flynn, J., concurring).

17 As we have indicated, the act as originally passed excluded employers

with fewer than five employees. Public Acts 1947, No. 171, § 1. No legislative

history is available regarding that or any other provision of Public Acts

1947, No. 171. The legislative history of Public Acts 1967, Nos. 253 and 426,

§ 2, which expanded the coverage of the act to employers with three or

more employees and added the prohibition against sex discrimination,

respectively, also is silent with respect to the reason for the small employer

exemption. It is noteworthy, however, that, in 1967, the legislature decided

to continue to exempt a category of small employers notwithstanding the

existence of testimony urging coverage of all employers in the state. For

example, Jerome Caplan, speaking on behalf of the League of Women Voters

of Connecticut, stated in relevant part: ‘‘ Based on a nationwide study and

consensus, members of the League of Women Voters believe that all levels

of government share the responsibility of providing equality of opportunity

for all persons in the [ United States]. [ This proposed legislation] would

provide more employment opportunities to people in Connecticut by includ-ing

more employers under the coverage of the [ act].

‘‘ However, since the League of Women Voters believes that all people

should have equal employment opportunities, we respectfully suggest that

all employers might be subject to the provisions of the [ act].’’ ( Emphasis

in original.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor, 1967 Sess.,

p. 142; see also id., p. 143, remarks of Arthur Green, director of the state

commission on civil rights, the predecessor to the commission on human

rights and opportunities (‘‘ It is very important that we extend as much as

possible coverage to all our citizens equal opportunities in employment.

Passage of this measure would do just that. . . . [ M] any of the states of

this nation have indeed gone beyond five, three, four [ employees], and many

states have now held that all employers are covered by this act. We do feel

that if this Committee would see favorably to pass on this measure, it would

help a great deal to provide more opportunities for our citizens.’’).

18 As we have indicated, the act initially exempted employers with fewer

than five employees. See General Statutes ( Sup. 1947) § 1360i. In 1967, the

legislature modified the exemption to exclude employers with fewer than

three employees. Public Acts 1967, No. 253.

19 As the Appellate Court noted, the tort of wrongful discharge in contra-vention

of public policy applies uniquely to terminations, and not to the

other discriminatory practices prohibited by the act. Thibodeau v. Design

Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 584 n. 7. The plaintiff suggests that this

distinction supports her contention that allowing a discriminatory discharge

claim against an employer with fewer than three employees would not

violate any legislative mandate reflected in the statutory exemption afforded

those employers. We disagree. The legislature has chosen to exempt small

employers from liability under the act for all discriminatory employment

practices, including discriminatory discharges. If the legislature had intended

to shield small employers from liability for discriminatory employment prac-tices

other than discriminatory discharges, it easily could have done so in

the act itself. See, e. g., Winchester v. Northwest Associates, 255 Conn. 379,

767 A. 2d 687 ( 2001).

20 The plaintiff does not allege the existence of state action in the pres-ent

case.

21 We note that our statement in Evening Sentinel, a case that involved

the application of the act to a particular factual scenario; see Evening

Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, supra, 168 Conn. 28; is

consistent with the remarks of the legislators who spoke in favor of the

1967 amendment to the act. For example, Representative James J. Kennelly

stated: ‘‘ This bill is in furtherance of this legislature’s commitment to true

equality of opportunity [ in] employment.’’ 12 H. R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1967 Sess.,

p. 2567. Similarly, Representative Thomas F. Dowd, Jr., stated: ‘‘ We on this

side of the aisle are very pleased to support this bill [ as] further testimony

to Connecticut’s commitment to non- discriminatory practices in what ever

form.’’ Id., p. 2568. Although these comments, like our statement in Evening

Sentinel, indicate a ‘‘ commitment’’ to eliminating discrimination in employ-ment,

the litigation burdens on small employers nevertheless remain a con-cern,

and, consequently, the legislature has sought to achieve its goal of

eliminating employment discrimination without subjecting small employers

to the costs associated with defending discrimination actions.

22 The dissent argues that we are free to recognize a common- law cause

of action in the present case because the act does not expressly supplant

common- law wrongful discharge claims. This argument misses the point.

The issue before us is not whether the act occupies the field generally

with respect to claims of discriminatory termination against employers but,

rather, whether the claim in the present case is barred by virtue of the

public policy expressed in the act’s exemption for small employers. It is

axiomatic that a common- law action based on the public policy exemption

to the at- will termination doctrine will not lie when that action is contrary

to this state���s public policy. In the present case, the public policy reflected

in that exemption is inconsistent with the premise upon which the plaintiff’s

common- law claim rests, namely, that our state’s public policy against sex

discrimination encompasses small employers. Thus, her claim must fail

for that reason. Whether the act otherwise supplants common- law actions

relating to the same subject matter simply is irrelevant to our resolution of

the present case.

23 See Molesworth v. Brandon, supra, 341 Md. 628, quoting Md. Ann. Code

art. 49B, § 14 ( Sup. 1995) ( plaintiff permitted to maintain claim of wrongful

discharge in violation of public policy in light of statutory declaration that

‘‘[ i] t is . . . the policy of the State of Maryland . . . to assure all persons

equal opportunity in receiving employment . . . regardless of . . . sex

. . . and to that end to prohibit discrimination in employment by any

person, group, labor organization, organization or any employer or his

agents’’ [ emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]); Roberts

v. Dudley, supra, 140 Wash. 2d 67, quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 49.12.200

( 2000) ( upholding cause of action for discriminatory discharge based upon

statutory pronouncement that ‘‘ every avenue of employment shall be open

to women; and any business, vocation, profession and calling followed and

pursued by men may be followed and pursued by women, and no person

shall by disqualified from engaging in or pursuing any business, vocation,

profession, calling or employment or excluded from any premises or place

of work or employment on account of sex’’ [ emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted]); Williamson v. Greene, supra, 200 W. Va. 429,

quoting W. Va. Code § 5- 11- 2 ( 1994) ( plaintiff stated claim for wrongful

discharge in contravention of public policy predicated on statutory declara-tion

that ‘‘[ i] t is the public policy of the state of West Virginia to provide

all of its citizens equal opportunity for employment . . . . Equal opportu-nity

in the [ area] of employment . . . is hereby declared to be a human

right or civil right of all persons without regard to . . . sex . . . . The

denial of these rights to properly qualified persons by reason of . . . sex

. . . is contrary to the principles of freedom and equality of opportunity

and is destructive to a free and democratic society.’’ [ Emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.]).

24 The dissent expresses concern that our resolution of the present case

‘‘ may be construed to vitiate the exception to the at- will employment’’ doc-trine

by requiring the plaintiff to show that ‘‘ her [ allegedly wrongful] dis-charge

violated an express statutory provision . . . .’’ This concern is

unfounded. We do not reject the plaintiff’s claim because she failed to allege

that the defendant had violated a specific statutory provision but, rather,

because her claim of a public policy violation is defeated by the policy

reflected in a specific statutory provision, namely, the provision exempting

small employers from the act. Indeed, it is the position advocated by the

dissent that is contrary to our well established jurisprudence in this area:

under our holdings, an employer cannot be held to have discharged an

employee in violation of this state’s public policy when the legislature clearly

has evinced an intent that, for reasons of policy, the employer shall not be

subject to liability for that discharge.