Supreme Court oral argument

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SHIRLEY WILLIAMS v. KRISTINE D. RAGAGLIA,

COMMISSIONER OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES

( SC 16587)

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Argued February 11— officially released August 6, 2002

Stephen G. Vitelli, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney

general, and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney gen-eral,

for the appellant ( defendant).

Royal J. Stark, with whom, on the brief, was Eric V.

McGrew, certified legal intern, for the appellee

( plaintiff).

Opinion

KATZ, J. The sole issue in this certified appeal is

whether the appeal by the plaintiff, Shirley Williams,

from the decision of the defendant, Kristine D. Ragaglia,

the commissioner of children and families ( commis-sioner),

revoking her special study foster care license

was rendered moot when the plaintiff was awarded

legal custody of the two children who were the subject

of the foster care license. The defendant appeals from

the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed

the trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s

appeal on the ground of mootness. We conclude that,

because the plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable

possibility that collateral consequences will arise from

the revocation of her foster care license, her claim was

not rendered moot when she was awarded legal custody

of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment

of the Appellate Court.

The record contains the following facts and proce-dural

history that are relevant to our resolution of this

issue. In 1993, the department of children and families

( department) issued a limited special study foster care

license ( special license) 1 to the plaintiff, specifically to

provide care to two minor half siblings, S and K. 2 The

plaintiff is also the legal guardian of a half sister of S

and K, D, and has minor children of her own. In May,

1997, after periodic renewals of the special license, the

department sent a letter to the plaintiff citing several

foster care regulations and stating that there were suffi-cient

grounds to recommend a revocation of her

license. 3 On November 26, 1997, after conducting hear-ings

on the department’s recommendation, a hearing

officer issued a proposed final decision. In the proposed

decision, the hearing officer ruled that, although the

plaintiff had violated certain foster care regulations,

her special license ‘‘[ would] be retained, with certain

conditions . . . as it would be in the children’s best

interests to maintain them in this placement despite

the licensing violations found.’’ 4

After department staff filed an objection to the pro-posed

decision, on June 3, 1998, the commissioner

remanded the matter for a further hearing to determine:

( 1) the extent to which the plaintiff had complied with

the conditions of the proposed final decision; ( 2) the

extent to which the plaintiff generally had complied

with the department licensing regulations since the con-clusion

of the previous hearing; and ( 3) the best inter-ests

of S and K. On March 9, 1999, the hearing officer

issued a second proposed final decision, finding that

the plaintiff’s adult daughter, who had been convicted

on felony drug charges, was living in the plaintiff’s

household, and concluding, therefore, that the plaintiff

was in violation of the regulations pertaining to limita-tions

on who may be members of the foster household

and on the provision of substitute care. The proposed

decision upheld the department’s May, 1997 recommen-dation

to revoke the plaintiff’s special license based

upon her noncompliance with licensing regulations.

The commissioner adopted the second proposed deci-sion

in its entirety on June 21, 1999.

The department then began action to remove S and

K from the plaintiff’s home. In response, the plaintiff

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the juvenile

matters division of the Superior Court seeking legal

custody of S and K. 5 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff

filed a contemporaneous administrative appeal in the

trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 4- 183, seeking

a reversal of the decision revoking her special license. 6

She also sought a stay of the decision revoking her

special license.

While the administrative appeal was pending, the

department decided to support the plaintiff’s petition

for custody and guardianship of S and K. On December

14, 1999, the trial court resolved the petition for the writ

of habeas corpus in the plaintiff’s favor and transferred

legal custody of S and K to her. As the children’s legal

guardian, the plaintiff no longer needed a special

license. See General Statutes § 17a- 93 ( d) ( defining

guardianship). 7 As a result, on May 25, 2000, the commis-sioner

filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s adminis-trative

appeal as moot. On June 27, 2000, after oral

argument, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s admin-istrative

appeal as moot.

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment

to the Appellate Court. On appeal, the plaintiff con-tended

that her claim was not moot because: ( 1) she

was then suffering and would continue to suffer harm

and adverse consequences as a result of the commis-sioner’s

decision to revoke her special license; and ( 2)

the trial court could grant practical relief from this harm

by overturning the revocation decision. Williams v.

Ragaglia, 64 Conn. App. 171, 172, 779 A. 2d 803 ( 2001).

The Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiff that her

claim was not moot. Id., 175. The court noted that, as

the biological mother of her own minor children and

as the legal guardian of S and K, who previously had

been wards of the department, the plaintiff was a mem-ber

of the class that the department is authorized to

investigate. 8 Id. The Appellate Court reasoned, there-fore,

that, if the plaintiff were to come under the depart-ment’s

scrutiny in the future, the department could use

the plaintiff��s record containing the license revocation

against her. Id. It further noted that the trial court could

provide practical relief to the plaintiff if it overturned

the license revocation, thereby giving the plaintiff a

clean record with the department. Id. Accordingly, the

Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiff’s appeal

was not moot, reversed the judgment of the trial court

and remanded the case to that court for an adjudication

on the merits of the administrative appeal. Id., 175– 76.

Thereafter, the commissioner petitioned this court for

certification to appeal. We granted the commissioner’s

petition, limited to the following question: ‘‘ Did the

Appellate Court properly conclude that [ the] adminis-trative

appeal regarding the revocation of the plaintiff’s

special study foster care license was not moot?’’ Wil-liams

v. Ragaglia, 258 Conn. 921, 782 A. 2d 1254 ( 2001).

A claim of mootness implicates the well established

rule that ‘‘[ a] n actual controversy must exist not only

at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the

pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pen-

dency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude

an appellate court from granting any practical relief

through its disposition of the merits, a case has become

moot.’’ ( Internal quotation marks omitted.) Giaimo v.

New Haven, 257 Conn. 481, 492– 93, 778 A. 2d 33 ( 2001).

The commissioner claims that the Appellate Court

improperly determined that the plaintiff’s claim was

not moot. Specifically, the commissioner contends that,

once the plaintiff obtained legal custody of S and K, the

special license was no longer required for the children’s

care. Therefore, relief in the form of reinstatement of

the special license is now impractical. The commis-sioner

also claims that the Appellate Court improperly

expanded our mootness jurisprudence by allowing a

speculative injury that might arise from future dealings

with the department to satisfy our justiciability

requirements.

The commissioner’s claim raises an issue that is

related to a similar claim raised in another case that

we have decided today. See State v. McElveen, 261

Conn. , A. 2d ( 2002). In McElveen, we

addressed the issue of whether the reasonable possibil-ity

for prejudicial collateral consequences stemming

from a challenged impropriety can establish the requi-site

injury necessary for jurisdiction. Id., . We

rejected therein the state’s invitation to follow the

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Spencer v.

Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 14, 118 S. Ct. 978, 140 L. Ed. 2d

43 ( 1998), which held that actual, necessary collateral

consequences were required in order to justify the con-tinuing

exercise of jurisdiction under the United States

constitution. State v. McElveen, supra, . Instead,

we reaffirmed this court’s long- standing mootness juris-prudence,

namely, that, despite developments during

the pendency of an appeal that would otherwise render

a claim moot, the court may retain jurisdiction when a

litigant shows that ‘‘ there is a reasonable possibility

that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur.’’ Id.,

; see, e. g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Whit-ney,

227 Conn. 829, 837 n. 13, 633 A. 2d 296 ( 1993); Hous-ing

Authority v. Lamothe, 225 Conn. 757, 765, 627 A. 2d

367 ( 1993); State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 161, 540 A. 2d

679 ( 1988); see also State v. Reilly, 60 Conn. App. 716,

724– 25, 760 A. 2d 1001 ( 2000); Haynes v. Bronson, 13

Conn. App. 708, 711, 539 A. 2d 592 ( 1988).

The commissioner does not contest our doctrine

establishing that potential collateral consequences aris-ing

from a challenged action defeat a claim of mootness.

Rather, the commissioner contends that the record

must demonstrate that the plaintiff will or is likely to

suffer specific, foreseeable collateral consequences

stemming from the commissioner’s decision to revoke

her special license. Essentially, the commissioner con-tends

that the Appellate Court’s reasoning that the

department could use the plaintiff’s license revocation

to her detriment in future proceedings does not satisfy

this standard. In support of this position, the commis-sioner

points out that anyone who has children may

come under the scrutiny of the department and that

the plaintiff’s license revocation, therefore, does not

render her specifically vulnerable to department scru-tiny.

Therefore, the commissioner claims that the plain-tiff

has failed to establish the likelihood of interacting

with the department in the future.

We reject the legal premise upon which the commis-sioner

relies. In McElveen, we confirmed that the appli-cation

of the collateral consequences mootness

doctrine is not predicated on a showing of the probabil-ity

of such consequences, but, rather, on a showing of

the reasonable possibility of collateral consequences.

State v. McElveen, supra, 261 Conn. . Accordingly,

this standard requires the plaintiff to demonstrate more

than an abstract, purely speculative injury, but does not

require the plaintiff to prove that it is more probable

than not that the prejudicial consequences will occur.

We recognize, as did the Appellate Court, the reason-able

possibility that the department could use the plain-tiff’s

license revocation to her detriment in future

proceedings. 9 See Williams v. Ragaglia, supra, 64 Conn.

App. 175. The possibility that the plaintiff will have

future interaction with the department is not purely

speculative. As noted previously, the plaintiff also vol-untarily

has assumed the care of another child who is

not her own, D, the half sister of S and K. Moreover, a

fourth child, E, who shares the same mother as D, S

and K, also resided with the plaintiff at one time. Of

these four children, the only blood relation to the plain-tiff

is D, who is the plaintiff’s niece through her brother.

In light of the plaintiff’s voluntary assumption of the

care of these four children, there is at least a reasonable

possibility that the plaintiff will be asked again to

assume the role of foster parent either by her brother

or by the children’s mother, who has a history of drug

addiction and who repeatedly has turned to the plaintiff

for help. 10 Accordingly, the plaintiff would have occa-sion

to interact with the department, at which time

it could consider, among other factors, the plaintiff’s

license revocation due to regulation infractions. Cf.

Housing Authority v. Lamothe, supra, 225 Conn. 765

( plaintiff’s consideration of defendant’s eviction as one

of many factors in deciding whether to rent to defendant

in future is cognizable collateral consequence). Surely,

if this court has taken into account the reasonable possi-bility

of criminal recidivism when addressing the collat-eral

consequences attending parole violations; see State

v. Smith, supra, 207 Conn. 161; and of repetitive rule

infractions by attorneys; see Statewide Grievance Com-mittee

v. Whitney, supra, 227 Conn. 837– 38 n. 13; we

likewise must consider the reasonable possibility that

a person, such as the plaintiff, who has agreed selflessly

to become a foster parent to children not her own, will

again in the future become a foster parent and have

occasion to interact with the department.

We further note that the reasonable possibility of

adverse use of the plaintiff’s record is not limited to

proceedings with the department. The department is

mandated statutorily to disclose its records to numer-ous

government agencies upon request without

obtaining the consent of the person who is the subject

of the record. See General Statutes ( Rev. to 2001) § 17a-

28 ( f), as amended by No. 01- 142, § 1, of the 2001 Public

Acts. 11 There are a variety of ways in which the record

pertaining to the plaintiff’s license revocation could be

used to her detriment. 12 The commissioner does not

assert that there is not a reasonable possibility that the

plaintiff’s record would be disclosed pursuant to the

statute and that adverse consequences reasonably

could attend such a disclosure. Instead, the commis-sioner

contends that the plaintiff’s interests are pro-tected

adequately against harmful disclosure by virtue

of a regulation that permits the plaintiff to contest any

alleged inaccuracies in personal data contained in the

department’s records. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies

§ 17- 415 ( g)- 11 ( a). We reject these measures as ade-quate

protection for the plaintiff here because the

department has discretion whether to make a change to

an individual’s record and an aggrieved party’s recourse

upon the department’s refusal to delete the contested

material is to submit a statement that will be included

when the record is disclosed. Regs., Conn. State Agen-cies

§ 17- 415 ( g)- 11 ( c).

Finally, we note that the dissemination of the plain-tiff’s

record to various government agencies pursuant

to § 17a- 28 ( f), albeit not a direct dissemination to the

public, would taint the plaintiff’s reputation. The revo-cation

of a foster care license for cause stigmatizes the

plaintiff as having been found to be an unfit caregiver.

Cf. Winegar v. Des Moines Independent Community

School District, 20 F. 3d 895, 899 ( 8th Cir.), cert. denied,

513 U. S. 964, 115 S. Ct. 426, 130 L. Ed. 2d 340 ( 1994)

( unjustified allegation of child abuse carries stigma);

Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F. 3d 992, 1000 ( 2d Cir. 1994)

( inclusion on list of child abusers attaches stigma even

though disclosure not to public generally but only to

authorized state agencies and potential employers in

child care field). Moreover, unlike some statutes that

impose confidentiality requirements on the disclosure

of records; see General Statutes § 19a- 583 ( barring dis-closure

of confidential human immunodeficiency virus

[ HIV] information); General Statutes § 46b- 124 ( a) ( pro-viding

that juvenile proceedings are confidential and

sealed); there is no such bar on the disclosure of records

obtained by an agency pursuant to § 17a- 28 ( f). There-fore,

the information ultimately could enter the public

domain and further stigmatize the plaintiff. Cf. Hodge

v. Jones, 31 F. 3d 157, 165 ( 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U. S.

1018, 115 S. Ct. 581, 130 L. Ed. 2d 496 ( 1994) ( extensive

confidentiality requirements under state law preclude

stigma of label of child abuser from attaching to investi-gative

report); Tracy v. Johnson, 156 Conn. 630, 632,

239 A. 2d 477 ( 1968) ( availability of Juvenile Court

records only upon order of court mitigates against

stigma from juvenile commitment record).

Courts have long recognized the importance of being

able to maintain one’s own good name. 13 ‘‘[ T] he individ-ual’s

right to the protection of his own good name

reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential

dignity and worth of every human being— a concept

at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.’’

( Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gertz v. Robert

Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 341, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed.

2d 789 ( 1974); see also Wisconsin v. Constantineau,

400 U. S. 433, 437, 91 S. Ct. 507, 27 L. Ed. 2d 515 ( 1971)

( emphasizing importance of ‘‘ a person’s good name,

reputation, honor, or integrity’’); In re Ames Dept.

Stores, Inc., 76 F. 3d 66, 69 ( 2d Cir. 1996), quoting W.

Shakespeare, Othello, act 3, sc. 3 (‘‘ ‘[ W] ho steals my

purse steals trash . . . . But he that filches from me

my good name . . . makes me poor indeed.’ ’’). Indeed,

the citizens of this state have placed such value on

one’s interest in his or her reputation as to afford it

constitutional protection. See Conn. Const., art. I, § 10

(‘‘[ a] ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an

injury done to him in his person, property or reputation,

shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and

justice administered without sale, denial or delay’’). In

recognition of the importance of one’s good name, this

court has determined, when addressing collateral con-sequences,

that an action that stains one’s reputation

is an injury that the court can consider in determining

whether it may grant practical relief. See State v. Whit-ney,

supra, 227 Conn. 837– 38 n. 13 (‘‘ collateral conse-quences

for attorney’s reputation and standing’’ render

case not moot); 14 State v. Smith, supra, 207 Conn. 161

( defendant’s probation revocation may ‘‘ affect his

standing in the community in its connotation of wrong-doing’’);

see also State v. Collic, 55 Conn. App. 196, 201,

738 A. 2d 1133 ( 1999) ( removal of probation violation

from defendant’s record would delete ‘‘ mark that would

otherwise . . . affect his reputation in the commu-nity’’);

State v. Johnson, 11 Conn. App. 251, 256, 527

A. 2d 250 ( 1987) ( probation revocation is burden in addi-tion

to conviction that ‘‘ will affect . . . [ defendant’s]

standing in the community because it connotes wrong-doing

and intractability’’).

We need not decide in the present case whether any

one of the adverse effects identified herein would be

sufficient on its own to establish a reasonable possibil-ity

of collateral consequences from the commissioner’s

decision to revoke the plaintiff’s special license. We

conclude, instead, that the totality of these possible

consequences is sufficient to permit the trial court to

retain jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim.

The commissioner cites four cases in support of her

contention that the plaintiff has not established the

requisite collateral consequences: Phaneuf v. Commis-sioner

of Motor Vehicles, 166 Conn. 449, 352 A. 2d 291

( 1974); In re Jeffrey C., 64 Conn. App. 55, 779 A. 2d 765

( 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 261 Conn. , A. 2d

( 2002); In re Elizabeth H., 45 Conn. App. 508, 696

A. 2d 1291, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 903, 701 A. 2d 328

( 1997), cert. denied, 523 U. S. 1137, 118 S. Ct. 1840, 140

L. Ed. 2d 1091 ( 1998); and Daly v. DelPonte, 27 Conn.

App. 495, 608 A. 2d 93 ( 1992), rev’d on other grounds,

225 Conn. 499, 624 A. 2d 876 ( 1993). We find nothing in

any of these cases that contravenes the reasoning that

we have set forth in this opinion.

Phaneuf and Daly both involved appeals from a deci-sion

by the commissioner of motor vehicles suspending

the plaintiff’s driver’s license. At issue in each case was

whether the claim had been rendered moot when the

suspension had expired. 15 Phaneuf v. Commissioner of

Motor Vehicles, supra, 166 Conn. 450; Daly v. DelPonte,

supra, 27 Conn. App. 496. In each of those cases, the

court mentioned two possible collateral consequences,

determined that the consequences were, in fact, nonex-istent,

and, accordingly, concluded that the plaintiff’s

claim was moot. 16 Phaneuf v. Commissioner of Motor

Vehicles, supra, 452– 53; Daly v. DelPonte, supra, 502–

503. In In re Jeffrey C., supra, 64 Conn. App. 65– 67, the

Appellate Court never addressed potential collateral

consequences but, instead, analyzed whether an excep-tion

to mootness— that the claim is ‘‘ ‘ capable of repeti-tion,

yet evading review’ ’’— was satisfied. The analysis

undertaken by a court in applying that exception, how-ever,

is different than the one used in determining if

collateral consequences have been established. See In

re Elizabeth H., supra, 45 Conn. App. 510– 12 ( analyzing

mootness issue under both approaches).

In In re Elizabeth H., however, the Appellate Court

addressed a claim of collateral consequences similar

to the claims raised in the present case. In that case,

the plaintiffs appealed from a judgment adjudicating

their children as neglected, uncared for and abused. Id.,

509. During the course of the proceedings, the children

reached the age of majority. Id. Nevertheless, the plain-tiffs

contended that the appeal was not moot, claiming

that the adjudication could make them ineligible to

become foster parents. Id., 510. The Appellate Court

rejected this claim, in part, because the bar to becoming

a foster parent arose from an order for temporary cus-tody,

not the judgment from which the plaintiffs were

appealing. 17 Id. The Appellate Court also considered

and rejected as a potential collateral consequence the

damage to the plaintiffs’ reputation arising from the

trial court’s adjudication of their children as neglected.

Id., 511. In reaching that conclusion, the Appellate Court

noted that the record of the juvenile proceedings that

had given rise to the plaintiffs’ claim was confidential

and sealed. Id., citing General Statutes § 46b- 124 ( a).

There is no such statutory protection available to the

plaintiff in the present case. See footnote 11 of this

opinion.

Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff has estab-lished

a reasonable possibility of prejudicial collateral

consequences from the commissioner’s decision to

revoke her special license that permit the trial court to

retain jurisdiction over her appeal from that decision.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion SULLIVAN, C. J., and PALMER and

VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

1 A special study foster care license authorizes the holder to provide

foster care only for the children specifically identified in the license. The

department typically utilizes the special license when a parent of a child

committed to the custody of the department requests that a specific individ-ual,

who is not licensed to provide general foster care, provide foster care

to his or her child. In the present case, the biological mother of S and

K; see footnote 2 of this opinion; whose parental rights ultimately were

terminated, had requested that the department place her children with the

plaintiff while the mother was in a drug addiction treatment program in

July, 1992.

2 The children are not identified by name in keeping with General Statutes

§ 46b- 142 ( b), which provides: ‘‘ The Department of Children and Families,

or any party at interest aggrieved by any final judgment or order of the

court, may appeal to the Appellate Court in accordance with the provisions

of section 52- 263. The clerk in charge of such juvenile matters shall forthwith,

after notice of any appeal, prepare and file with the clerk of the Appellate

Court the certified copy of the record of the case from which such appeal

has been taken. The name of the child or youth involved in any such appeal

shall not appear on the record of the appeal, and the records and papers

of any juvenile case filed in the Appellate Court shall be open for inspection

only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the court.’’

3 The letter to the plaintiff cited the following department regulations:

Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 17a- 145- 143 ( pertaining to health standards

for foster parents and household members); Regs., Conn. State Agencies

§ 17a- 145- 148 ( pertaining to substitute child care when adults in foster home

are absent for extended period of time); and Regs., Conn. State Agencies

§ 17a- 145- 152 ( a) and ( d) ( pertaining to granting and approving licenses

when household member of foster home either has been convicted of certain

crimes, has had allegation of child abuse substantiated, has had minor

removed from member’s care due to abuse or neglect, or has knowingly

arranged for substitute care by such person).

After hearings pertaining to these allegations, the department issued a

second letter to the plaintiff, which no longer referred to § 17a- 145- 143 or

§ 17a- 145- 152 ( a) of the regulations. The letter, however, cited the following

additional regulations, which were not cited in the first letter: Regs., Conn.

State Agencies § 17a- 145- 133 ( stating general requirements for issuing or

approving foster care license); Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 17a- 145- 144

( listing character standards for foster parents and household members);

and Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 17a- 145- 152 ( b) ( stating that license

renewal may be denied due to criminal status of household members).

4 The following conditions were set forth in the 1997 proposed decision:

( 1) that the plaintiff maintain a list of at least three department- approved

alternate caregivers; ( 2) that, within sixty days of the decision, the plaintiff

return to work and provide the department with proof of income sufficient

to meet the needs of the foster family as required by § 17a- 145- 147 of the

Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies; and ( 3) that the department be

allowed to perform unannounced visits at the plaintiff’s home for a period

of six months.

5 The plaintiff filed the petition pursuant to General Statutes § 52- 466 ( f),

which provides: ‘‘ A foster parent or an approved adoptive parent shall have

standing to make application for a writ of habeas corpus regarding the

custody of a child currently or recently in his care for a continuous period

of not less than ninety days in the case of a child under three years of age

at the time of such application and not less than one hundred eighty days

in the case of any other child.’’

6 The plaintiff cited numerous grounds for her appeal, challenging both

the legal and factual underpinnings of the commissioner’s decision.

7 General Statutes § 17a- 93 ( d) provides: ‘‘ ‘ Guardianship’ means guardian-ship,

unless otherwise specified, of the person of a minor and refers to the

obligation of care and control, the right to custody and the duty and authority

to make major decisions affecting such minor’s welfare, including, but not

limited to, consent determinations regarding marriage, enlistment in the

armed forces and major medical, psychiatric or surgical treatment . . . .’’

See also General Statutes § 45a- 604 ( 5) ( guardian defined for purposes of

guardians of person of minor under Probate Court procedure).

8 The department’s authority to investigate child welfare issues is derived

from several statutory provisions. See, e. g., General Statutes § 17a- 90 ( a)

( granting commissioner ‘��� general supervision over the welfare of children

who require care and protection of the state’’); General Statutes § 17a- 101g

( authorizing department to investigate allegations of child abuse).

9 The commissioner contends that the department’s recommendation to

the habeas court that the plaintiff should be appointed as guardian of S and

K ‘‘ clearly belies any contention that any speculative future dealings with

the [ department] would be negatively influenced by the [ special license]

revocation.’’ We note, however, that if the commissioner has no intention

of ever using the record to the plaintiff’s detriment, the commissioner easily

could have resolved this matter at any stage in the proceedings, throughout

this lengthy appellate process, by vacating the revocation decision volun-tarily.

10 S and K were placed with the plaintiff in July, 1992, when their mother

signed a voluntary placement agreement while hospitalized for drug addic-tion

treatment. At the trial court proceeding terminating the mother’s paren-tal

rights, the trial court noted that the mother had an ‘‘ ongoing substance

abuse problem and history of failed treatments.’’ Accordingly, it is not only

reasonably possible that the plaintiff will seek to become a foster parent

in the future, but, more specifically, that the plaintiff may be called upon

to assume the care of any future children of the mother of D, E, S and K.

11 General Statutes ( Rev. to 2001) § 17a- 28 ( f), as amended by No. 01- 142,

§ 1, of the 2001 Public Acts, provides: ‘‘ The commissioner or the commission-er’s

designee shall, upon request, promptly provide copies of records, with-out

the consent of a person, to ( 1) a law enforcement agency, ( 2) the Chief

State’s Attorney or the Chief State’s Attorney’s designee or a state’s attorney

for the judicial district in which the child resides or in which the alleged

abuse or neglect occurred or the state’s attorney’s designee, for purposes

of investigating or prosecuting an allegation of child abuse or neglect, ( 3)

the attorney appointed to represent a child in any court in litigation affecting

the best interests of the child, ( 4) a guardian ad litem appointed to represent

a child in any court in litigation affecting the best interests of the child, ( 5)

the Department of Public Health, which licenses any person to care for

children for the purposes of determining suitability of such person for

licensure, ( 6) any state agency which licenses such person to educate or

care for children pursuant to section 10- 145b or 17a- 101j, ( 7) the Governor,

when requested in writing, in the course of the Governor’s official functions

or the Legislative Program Review and Investigations Committee, the com-mittee

of the General Assembly on judiciary and the committee of the

General Assembly having cognizance of matters involving children when

requested in the course of such committees’ official functions in writing,

and upon a majority vote of said committee, provided no names or other

identifying information shall be disclosed unless it is essential to the legisla-tive

or gubernatorial purpose, ( 8) a local or regional board of education,

provided the records are limited to educational records created or obtained

by the state or Connecticut- Unified School District # 2, established pursuant

to section 17a- 37, and ( 9) a party in a custody proceeding under section

17a- 112, or section 46b- 129, as amended by this act, in the Superior Court

where such records concern a child who is the subject of the proceeding

or the parent of such child. A disclosure under this section shall be made

of any part of a record, whether or not created by the department, provided

no confidential record of the Superior Court shall be disclosed other than

the petition and any affidavits filed therewith in the superior court for

juvenile matters, except upon an order of a judge of the Superior Court for

good cause shown. The commissioner shall also disclose the name of any

individual who cooperates with an investigation of a report of child abuse

or neglect to such law enforcement agency or state’s attorney for purposes

of investigating or prosecuting an allegation of child abuse or neglect. The

commissioner or the commissioner’s designee shall, upon request, promptly

provide copies of records, without the consent of the person, to ( A) the

Department of Public Health for the purpose of determining the suitability

of a person to care for children in a facility licensed under sections 19a- 77

to 19a- 80, inclusive, 19a- 82 to 19a- 87, inclusive, and 19a- 87b, and ( B) the

Department of Social Services for determining the suitability of a person

for any payment from the department for providing child care.’’

The preceding language is the current codification of § 17a- 28 ( f). Herein-after,

references to § 17a- 28 ( f) are to the 2001 revision, as amended by

Public Act 01- 142.

12 For example, if an allegation of child abuse were to be made against

the plaintiff, it is foreseeable that law enforcement officers or the state’s

attorney’s office would request disclosure of the plaintiff’s record from the

department. See General Statutes § 17a- 28 ( f) ( 1) and ( 2). It does not stretch

the imagination to assume that even an unsubstantiated allegation would

be treated more seriously based on the plaintiff’s record of having had her

foster care license revoked for cause. In addition, if the plaintiff were to

seek future employment in the child care or childhood education field, the

record could impact her ability to become licensed or to become eligible

for government payment for providing child care services. See General

Statutes § 17a- 28 ( f) ( 5) and ( 6).

The commissioner contends that we should not consider the potential

collateral consequences of disclosure under § 17a- 28 ( f) because the plaintiff

did not raise this claim in the trial court. As the commissioner correctly

points out, this court generally does not address a theory that was not raised

before the trial court. Mellon v. Century Cable Management Corp., 247

Conn. 790, 799, 725 A. 2d 943 ( 1999) ( party ‘‘ may not try its case on one

theory and appeal on another’’). We note, however, an important distinction

in the present case. The plaintiff has not asserted a new legal theory but,

instead, has offered yet another example of how the license revocation

could be used to her detriment to support the theory she already had raised

in the trial court.

13 ‘‘ While an individual may not have a ‘ property’ or ‘ liberty’ interest in

his or her reputation so as to trigger due process protections, Paul v. Davis,

424 U. S. 693, 712 [ 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405] ( 1976), that question is

obviously distinct from whether an interest in one’s reputation is sufficient

to defeat a claim of mootness.’’ Spencer v. Kemna, supra, 523 U. S. 24 n. 4

( Stevens, J., dissenting).

14 We note that in Crone v. Gill, 250 Conn. 476, 480– 81, 736 A. 2d 131

( 1999), we rejected an attorney’s claim that any injury to his reputation as

a result of a trial court decision disqualifying him from representing a

particular client demonstrated the requisite aggrievement to establish stand-ing.

Our reasoning in that case, however, may be reconciled with our decision

in Whitney, in which we recognized that injury to an attorney’s reputation

was a cognizable collateral consequence sufficient to defeat a claim of

mootness. State v. Whitney, supra, 227 Conn. 837– 38 n. 13. In Crone, we

rejected the plaintiff’s claim on the ground that he had failed to satisfy the

second prong of the aggrievement test, which would have required that the

plaintiff demonstrate that the right to represent a particular client was

protected under the plaintiff’s general right to practice law. Crone v. Gill,

supra, 481. We did express doubts, however, as to whether the plaintiff

could satisfy the first prong of the test, because the plaintiff had failed to

offer specific proof as to harm to his reputation. Id., 480– 81. The plaintiff had

claimed that an injury arose because his disqualification ‘‘ was tantamount to

a finding of professional misconduct.’’ Id., 481 n. 6. We questioned whether

the plaintiff had suffered any injury because the trial court did not denigrate

the plaintiff’s capabilities or integrity but, rather, predicated its decision on

protecting the client from the plaintiff’s potential conflict of interest. Id. By

contrast, in Whitney, the plaintiff was found to have violated the Rules of

Professional Conduct. State v. Whitney, supra, 837– 38 n. 13.

15 As the commissioner points out, the plaintiff in Daly also had raised a

challenge to the motor vehicle commissioner’s decision placing him on

medical probation as a condition of retaining his driver’s license. Daly v.

DelPonte, supra, 27 Conn. App. 499. The Appellate Court determined that

this claim also was moot because, once the plaintiff’s license had been

suspended, the condition of probation was rendered meaningless. Id. The

opinion in Daly does not indicate, however, that the plaintiff had ever raised

in the Appellate Court the issue of collateral consequences arising from the

imposition of the condition to defeat the assertion of mootness.

16 The Appellate Court determined that ‘‘[ a] driver’s license suspension

. . . ‘ does not have the effect of a conviction, nor would [ it] entail any of the

collateral legal disabilities ordinarily produced by conviction of a criminal

offense.’ ’’ Daly v. DelPonte, supra, 27 Conn. App. 503, quoting Phaneuf v.

Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 166 Conn. 453. The court also

rejected the notion that the plaintiff could suffer adverse effects arising

from points entered onto his record because he had failed to demonstrate

that points in fact had been so entered. Phaneuf v. Commissioner of Motor

Vehicles, supra, 453; Daly v. DelPonte, supra, 503.

17 The court in In re Elizabeth H., supra, 45 Conn. App. 510, also noted

that there was no evidence in the record that the plaintiffs had any intention

of applying to become foster parents in the future. By contrast, in the present

case, the plaintiff has assumed the care of three children who are not her

own, underscoring the reasonable possibility that she will become a foster

parent in the future.